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Abstract 
Current mainstream visions of water management tend to promote a view of river basin 
development as a technical issue where experts and managers endeavour to match supply and 
demand by the application of technology, sound science, rational and neutral problem-solving 
approaches, and -whenever deemed necessary- an adequate cocktail of participation from 
relevant stakeholders. This paper, in contrast, emphasizes that river basin development and 
management is about shifting patterns of access to a contested and scarce resource and, as 
such, is inherently a political process. 
I argue that an analysis of physical and social characteristics and constraints of river basins 
must be paralleled by giving attention to ideas, interests and institutions. In particular I focus 
on two crucial political drivers of river basin development that need to be given more 
consideration: the converging interests of the main actors involved in capital-intensive water 
investments and the use of discursive power in the justification of large-scale investments. 
This serves as a background to explain why some river basins get overbuilt and how scarcity 
is generated artificially. With growing competition and pressure over resources, river basin 
development and management is an arena where actors mobilize discursive, political and 
other resources to shift benefits, costs and risk, spatially and socially, in a way that favours 
their interests or world view. Repoliticizing visions of river basin management offers a 
different and complementary perspective that allows a better understanding of 
society/environment relationships. 
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Introduction 
Current mainstream visions of water management tend to promote a view of river basin 
development as a technical issue where experts and managers endeavour to match supply and 
demand, while limiting or mitigating unintended negative effects. These objectives are met 
by the application of technology, sound science, rational and neutral problem-solving 
approaches, and -whenever deemed necessary- an adequate cocktail of participation from 
relevant stakeholders. A large part of research on water is focused on improving, among other 
things, water productivity, irrigation efficiency, crop management, or manipulation of 
hydraulic infrastructures. All these issues are extremely important and deserve the attention 
they receive, but governance issues, in contrast, often do not receive the attention they 
deserve. Although river basin development and management demand increasing technical 
skills they are –eventually- also about the access to, and the allocation of, a contested and 
scarce resource. As such, they are inherently political and this dimension must receive as 
much attention as the more technical ones. 
This paper first provides examples of interconnectedness within river basins and shows the 
diversity of the hydrologic cross-basin interactions and the social-political nature of the 
externalities that travel across basins through the hydrological cycle. The second section 
exemplifies the human-made and political nature of basin overdevelopment and induced 
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water scarcity, while the third section illustrates the discursive dimension of power in the 
shaping the trajectories of river basins. The last section reflects on the concept of river-basin 
governance in the light of the preceding examples. 
Interconnectedness of river basins 
Patterns of water use are often attuned to a particular hydrologic regime, characterized by its 
average water availability and its variability, and tend to be affected negatively by any 
modifications. Hydrological interactions are typified by the commonplace upstream-
downstream effect, whereby downstream users have to cope with variations in the 
hydrological regime occurring in upper parts of the basin. But these interactions are not 
socially neutral and they define geographies of environmental injustice (Molle 2008a). Users 
and stakeholders are not born equal and differ in their access to natural or financial resources, 
and by their political power. Socio-political structures will therefore shape the way resources 
are used and the way benefits, costs, and risks are distributed (Swyngedouw and Kaïka 2002, 
Molle et al. 2007). Flood-prone areas, polluted neighbourhoods, or water-short localities are 
generally highly correlated with the occurrence of social groups characterized by higher 
levels of poverty and vulnerability. 
The case of the destruction of part of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina is illustrative of the 
socio-political dimension of flood damage (Congleton 2006). The disaster was shaped by the 
engineering of nature and the profound transformations of the landscape wrought to serve 
particular economic and class interests: 
• Protective coastal marshes and wetlands were destroyed by erosion because the delta 
ceased to be sustained by silt, now directed to deep waters off the continental shelf to 
allow for easy river navigation; 
• Channelling and dredging of the rivers, canals opened to facilitate drilling for oil and 
natural gas and laying pipelines, eased the penetration of seawater inland; 
• Dikes raised to protect industrial and urban areas and to confine Lake Pontchartrain, 
once a natural buffer, increased water levels in the river channels; and 
• The elevation of the sea level and temperature that is in all likelihood associated with 
global warming. 
These are all human-made ingredients for a disaster. But the disaster also did not impact the 
population uniformly. Most poor, black neighbourhoods are located in low-lying flood-prone 
areas. This emphasized in 1965 when the city was struck by Hurricane Betsy and when the 
Lower Ninth Ward, an area almost entirely under the poverty line and 99% black, was 
intentionally flooded to spare the wealthy white uptown neighbourhoods (Caldwell 2005). 
Although not deliberate on this occasion, flooding by Katrina was similarly much more 
severe in poor, black neighbourhoods. 
The paradigmatic example of redistribution of costs and benefits is the construction of dams. 
Dams usually provide electricity for urbanites and industrial interests, sometimes also 
allowing irrigation of downstream areas, but their impact is concentrated on rural people who 
have generally been displaced to marginal lands with little or no compensation. Take the 
example of the Pak Mun dam in Northeast Thailand. The dam produces only 0.1% of Thai 
electricity but has drastically impacted all the fisheries of the lower Chi-Mun basin and the 
thousands of fishermen living in it. Another typical conflict characterized by asymmetries of 
power is that between cities (or tourism) and agriculture (Molle and Berkoff 2006). Cities 
typically "siphon water away from agriculture" (Postel 1999), generally by stealth or by 
administrative fiat, rarely through market mechanisms. Cities have thus the power to impose 
externalities on others in terms of reallocation (benefits forgone in other uses), pollution, 
flood damage (see above), and aquifer depletion. 
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Consider industrial use of groundwater in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area, which makes up 
90% of the water used by industry. The Thai federation of industries has always used its 
political power to stave off increases in the price of groundwater designed to reduce 
pumping. The resulting costs in terms of land subsidence (one third of the city is now below 
sea level), increased costs in drainage (pumping stations) and flood protection (dikes have to 
be raised continuously) are shifted to tax payers and to the country as a whole. 
But the generation of waterborne externalities is often less straightforward and visible than in 
such clear-cut cases. Modification of groundwater dynamics by excess abstraction, for 
example, has indirect impact on springs and on the baseflows that support rivers in dry 
periods. These baseflows are invisible and can be reversed by the depletion of adjacent 
aquifers: instead of contributing to the river flow and to downstream users, depleted aquifers 
are now recharged by the river and water abstractors re-appropriate water that used to flow 
downstream. 
Table 1 shows a variety of hydrological impacts brought about by modifications of the 
hydrological regime in terms of quantity, quality, timing or sediment load. Examples include 
both point, large-scale and scattered/diffuse human interventions. Water flows, and its four 
characteristics considered here, are affected by storage, water harvesting, pumping, 
diversions, etc. but also by land-use change. Alteration of flows impacts on aquatic 
ecosystems, other users, and geomorphological processes (e.g. delta fanning or land 
subsidence). 
Table 1. Examples of upstream-downstream interactions between water users in a river 
basin. Source: Molle 2008a. 
Upstream 
downstream
Variable
Quantity
Upstream diversion 
scheme on 
downstream  
irrigation area
Water harvesting 
(or small tanks) on a 
downstream dam
Cities out-pumping 
irrigation wells
Wells on qanats; 
deep wells on 
shallow wells
Quality
Cities or industries  
on irrigated 
agriculture
Diffuse pollution of 
agriculture on city 
supplies
Cities contaminating  
groundwater used in 
pumping irrigation
Diffuse agricultural 
pollution on village 
groundwater-based 
water supply
Timing
Hydropower 
generation on large 
irrigation schemes or 
fisheries
Small tanks delay 
onset of wet season 
flows and affect 
biological cues
Hydropower 
generation on 
wetland ecosystems
Water harvesting 
reduces runoff/flood 
and downstream 
groundwater recharge
Sediment load 
Large-scale 
deforestation on 
reservoirs
Overgrazing, or 
erosion in small-
holder agriculture on 
reservoir (siltation)
Dam retaining silt 
vs. fertilization of 
downstream 
floodplains
Diffuse deforestation 
impact on silt load 
and delta fanning
Point, large-scale 
user or intervention
Diffuse, scattered users 
or interventions
 
3 
Molle 
All these examples suggest that human manipulations of the hydrologic cycle, whether direct 
or indirect, are all likely to generate externalities. In addition, all the interactions described 
above increase with human pressure on the resources and with basin closure. At the same 
time, basin closure means that most water is depleted and that the system has less and less 
resilience. Conflict resolution thus becomes a central feature of water management and 
politics, governance, and power also assume greater importance. As the stakes get higher and 
environmental externalities become harder to avoid, issues of spatial and environmental 
justice move to take centre stage. 
The overbuilding of river basins 
This raises the crucial question of why water resources invariably seem to be exploited until 
the ‘slack’ in the system is removed, that is, until the ‘excess’ water that is needed to absorb 
variations in supply, buffer impact on ecosystems, and limit restrictions to users is 
committed. Although pressure on resources is frequently presented as the result of a 
Malthusian decline in per capita water endowment, it is the inability of societies to put 
voluntary limits on water abstraction that is more meaningful. Basin closure is predominantly 
driven by a process of basin overbuilding whereby development and commitment of water 
resources almost invariably outstrip available resources. The societal determinants of this 
process revolve around a powerful convergence of interests and incentives (see more details 
in Molle 2008b, Berkoff, 2001). Continued development of water resources infrastructure 
appears to be a ‘natural’ option favoured by the most powerful decision makers: 
• Politicians, whether at the local or government level, have long cherished iconic 
large-scale projects that are seen as the best way to build up constituencies (O'Mara 
1990); 
• State technical agencies and bureaucracies need projects to ensure sustained budgets 
and to uphold their professional legitimacy; 
• Private consulting and construction firms look for a steady flow of business 
opportunities; and last 
• Development banks and cooperation agencies also have vested interests in 
maximizing disbursement of funds (Chambers 1997). 
Such a powerful convergence of interests explains why projects to develop water resources 
are difficult to challenge. In most cases, the segments of the population that are impacted and 
the civil society groups that come to the defense of the environment are weak or nonexistent. 
This of course is not always the case, and there are numerous cases where projects have been 
opposed and stalled, but these examples are few compared with the 45,000 high dams that 
were constructed during the 20th century, to take only one aspect of infrastructural 
development (WCD 2000). 
Capital-intensive water projects, and this seems to apply to all countries and not just to water 
infrastructures alone, are prone to corruption, which siphons off public money into the 
pockets of private individuals (Repetto 1986). 
The dominant view of infrastructure development is based on a technical and economic 
rationality. Engineering design and cost-benefit analyses are supposed to guide decision-
makers in their investments. More recently environmental impact assessments and strategic 
impact assessments have been added to the planners' tool box to estimate better the social and 
environmental impacts, which used to be glossed over in the past. Yet, as is familiar to any 
practitioner involved in such matters, practice has often been little affected by these 
refinements. One reason is that the range of acceptable hypotheses (e.g. what will be the 
cropping pattern or the yield of rice after completion of the project?) is large enough to make 
conclusions malleable. Another is that in the absence of scrutiny, public disclosure or 
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discussion, many of these studies are conveniently either ignored or limited to mitigation 
measures. Eventually the projects tend to reflect the expectations of the agencies that fund 
them. 
Here, again, it becomes clear that decisions regarding development of water resources are 
seldom the result of strict rational approaches but, rather, a reflection of the nature of 
dominant interests and the distribution of decision-making power. The provision of a public 
good is almost inevitably intertwined with financial and political interests. Failure to 
recognize the importance of this conclusion leads inevitably to basin overbuilding. Water 
scarcity is therefore artificially generated by the over commitment of resources, paving the 
way for future calls for yet further development. 
River basins trajectories and discursive power 
Continued development of water resources, but also particular policies seeking to conserve or 
to reallocate water, or to control floods, must be legitimized and made acceptable to the 
broader community, especially in terms of their anticipated impacts on society as a whole. 
Although plans, data and cost-benefits analyses are important, they are often secondary 
instruments in the wider political debate. 
Decision makers or interest groups use discursive power to frame debates in ways that 
favour, obscure or exclude particular options. The pervasiveness and influence of discursive 
power in the debate over development of river basins and environmental justice overwhelm 
the weaker segments of the population, who have little voice and political clout, and limited 
access to information, media and other channels of communication. 
One important aspect of the politics of knowledge is what Foucault has termed “political 
technologies”, that is, the devices by which inherently political debates are framed in 
scientific, technical, neutral and allegedly objective terms (Shore and Wright, 1997). The 
concept of integrated water resources management (IWRM) is an example of the woolly 
consensual "Nirvana concept" (see Molle 2008c), which obscures the antagonistic nature of 
the criteria of economic efficiency, social equity and environmental sustainability. IWRM 
holds the promise that with good will and benevolent stakeholders, sound data and good 
science, these dimensions can be reconciled for the common good. The legitimacy of IWRM, 
allegedly sanctioned and embraced at the international level, is mobilized to justify particular 
policy options or interventions. 
For example, the concept of the river basin as a ‘natural’ unit for managing water resources 
has served to justify interventions in upper catchments by downstream stakeholders such as 
urban elites and state bureaucracies. In Thailand, for example, this has led to extensive ‘state 
enclosures’ in the north of the country. Hill tribes and their slash-and-burn cultivation 
practices are blamed for floods (and scarce dry-season flows alike). Widespread afforestation 
has been justified on the grounds that ‘trees are good’ and on the myth that forests act as 
‘sponges’; dams have been built by mobilizing the support and symbolic power of the King 
as a means to close debates. In practice, the ‘need to control our water heads’ has resulted in 
displacement of minorities, eased state control over border areas, favoured urban-based 
interests of keeping nature for consumption (ecotourism), and business interests (e.g., 
logging, pulp, construction industries). 
Another dimension of discursive power with impacts on basin-level equity is that of green 
ideologies conveyed by international conservationist NGOs. These organizations have been 
instrumental in "sanctuarizing" large areas of Africa as national parks, sanctuaries or game 
reserves. While all contribute to biodiversity conservation, they also fuel ecotourism and 
game-hunting industries that are largely in the hand of foreigners; and they restrain the access 
of local residents to natural resources (or exclude them altogether). 
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One particular dimension of state discursive power is the recourse to overriding justifications 
that "securitize" a particular issue and foreclose further debate (Molle 2008b, Warner 2008). 
National security, food self-sufficiency, import substitution and modernization have been 
heavily used to justify mega water projects and to paint their negative consequences as a 
necessary sacrifice. Other justifications, more frequently used nowadays, include poverty 
alleviation and self-sufficiency in energy. I do not suggest that these arguments are irrelevant: 
the problem lies in the use of a TINA (there is no alternative) type of rhetoric, where projects 
are withdrawn from scrutiny because the decision has already been taken. 
Repoliticizing river basin governance: Why learning from the past is not enough 
Few would deny, nowadays, that development of water resource has often entailed 
unexpected or neglected social and environmental impacts. But does not the solution, after 
all, lie in learning from past mistakes? And are not current paradigms giving due attention to 
issues that used to be overlooked? 
There seems to be ample change in the way water problems and problems and solutions are 
framed. IWRM provides a handy integration of the competing concepts on water 
management, with development banks, aid agencies, consultants, and even green or 
livelihood-oriented NGOs have seemingly adopted this shared platform. There is a common 
understanding that water should be managed with due attention to its economic (efficiency), 
social (equity) and environmental dimensions. The massive promotion of IWRM by 
international agencies, conferences, academic literature, countless training and capacity 
building sessions suggests that integrative concepts have now been mainstreamed and have 
successfully displaced narrow sectoral or technocentric viewpoints. 
In practice, however, the implementation of IWRM has generally remained short of 
expectations (Biswas 2004) and frequently appears as a smoke screen for business as usual 
strategies (Molle 2008c). The prevailing concept seems to be that problems have become 
more complex and thus need to be addressed through redoubled efforts at mobilizing more 
data, better information, bigger computers to come to term with this complexity. 
The tendency to depoliticize problems tends to make these new approaches appear as mere 
extensions of earlier technical approaches. IWRM, for example, despite the emphasis placed 
on participation by its proponents, is most frequently pictured as a managerial approach. Its 
definition emphasizes the three desired ‘E’s (efficiency, equity and environmental 
sustainability). It implies that all three can be achieved concomitantly if, as the word 
‘maximize’ suggests, problem-solving can be informed by neutral and rational approaches, 
good science and expert knowledge that reflect all three dimensions, rather than being 
informed by only one of them. River Basin Organizations, for example, are said to be 
"increasingly promoted as a scientific/rational means of administration for water" (UNDESA 
and GWP, 2006). A striking example of an enduring expert-based approach is provided by 
the recent Asian Water Development Outlook published by the Asian Development Bank 
(2007) and summarized by Biswas and Seetharam (2007) who state: 
In-depth analyses prepared for the Outlook [2007] indicate that the Asian countries are not facing 
a water crisis because of physical scarcities of the resource, but because of poor management. 
With the knowledge, technology and experience that are now available within the Asian region as 
a whole, the water problems of all the Asian countries can be solved. Given adequate capacity 
development, intensified political will, and appropriate investments, one can be cautiously 
optimistic of Asia’s water future (my emphasis). 
Another example is provided by the World Bank background paper for the Mexico World 
Water Forum, Water, Growth and Development. Emphasis is placed on water ‘security’ and 
the report develops the argument that national development is impossible without 
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comprehensive development of water infrastructure. Past mistakes ‘will be avoided’ by 
parallel ‘sequenced’ investments in capacity building and by ‘strengthening institutions’, 
resulting in ‘responsible growth’ (Grey and Sadoff 2006). Accordingly, the solution lies in 
the money and the expertise that development banks and other institutional actors are ready to 
provide. 
Further evidence of the adherence to expert-driven approaches is provided by the popularity 
of approaches based on the implementation of ‘best practices’ and models, defined as recipes 
supposedly sanctioned by international experience, which can be picked up where and when 
similar situations arise. In other words, IWRM approaches draw more on a concept of 
instrumental rationality than on the politics of resource management (Miller and Hirsch 2003; 
Merrey et al. 2007, Molle et al. 2007). In the background, proper ‘policies and institutions’ 
must be in place and the governments must be able to exercise ‘their responsibilities of good 
water governance’, while  ‘ensuring empowerment of the poor’ (Jonch-Clausen 2004, 
UNDESA and GWP 2006). 
Summing up, the political dimension of the development of river basins is consistently 
overlooked. The adjective ‘political’ seems to be a dirty word that comes with ideas of 
corruption or malpractice, social conflicts or upheavals and party politics. But it also refers to 
the sound and fair provision of public goods to society. The naked truth, however, is that little 
improvement if possible without a rebalancing of decision-making power and empowerment 
of the community at large. 
In this article I have shown that the nature of the hydrologic cycle and the complexity of 
societies constantly combine to create and rework new spatial distributions of the costs, 
benefits and risks associated with water in its broadest sense. This spatial distribution is 
inherently social and political, and is shaped by the distribution of power within society. It is 
also defined by the connectivity of aquatic ecosystems and how these are affected by human 
interventions. The analysis of a basin trajectory must answer the question. “How did we get 
there?” The technical or institutional options proposed must be analyzed in terms of their 
distributive impact and of their link to the ideas, interests and institutional configuration that 
characterize and define the individual and collective actors concerned. 
References 
 
Berkoff, J. (2001). Irrigation, grain markets and the poor. Presentation to ICID British Chapter: 21 February 
2001. 
Biswas, A.K. (2004). Integrated water resources management: A reassessment. Water International 29, 248-
256. 
Biswas, A.K.; Seetharam, K.E. (2007). Asian water development outlook, 2007: Achieving water security for 
Asia. Manila: Asian Development Bank. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 
24(1): 145-176. 
Caldwell, R. (2005). New Orleans: the making of an urban catastrophe. MRzine. URL: 
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/caldwell120905.html. 
Chambers, R. (1999). Whose reality counts? Putting the first last. London, UK: ITDG Publishing. 
Congleton, R.D. (2006). The story of Katrina: New Orleans and the political economy of catastrophe. Public 
Choice 127, 5–30. 
Grey, D. and Sadoff, C. (2006). Water for growth and development. Background paper for the World Water 
Forum, Mexico. 
Jonch-Clausen, T. (2004). Integrated water resources management (IWRM): Why, what and how? TEC 
Background Paper No. 10. Stockholm: GWP. 
7 
Molle 
Merrey, D.J.; Meinzen-Dick, R. and Mollinga, P. (2007). Policy and institutional reform: The art of the possible. 
In Molden, D. (ed.) Water for Food- Water for Life, Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management 
in Agriculture. London: EarthScan. Pp.193-232. 
Miller, F. and Hirsch, P. (2003). Civil society and internationalized river basin management. Working Paper 
No. 7. Sydney: Australian Mekong Resource Centre, University of Sydney. 
Molle, F. (2008a). River basins and spatial justice: Distributing benefits, costs and risk. Paper presented to the 
Conference: Justice et Injustices Spatiales, Nanterre, France 2008. 
Molle, F. (2008b). Why enough is never enough: The societal determinants of river basin closure. International 
Journal of Water Resource Development 24, 247-256. 
Molle, F. (2008c). Nirvana concepts, narratives and policy models: Insights from the water sector. Water 
Alternatives 1(1). 
Molle, F. and Berkoff, J. (2006). Cities versus agriculture: Revisiting intersectoral water transfers, potential 
gains and conflicts. Colombo, Sri Lanka: IWMI. (Comprehensive Assessment Research Report 10). 
URL: http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/Assessment/Publications/research_reports.htm. 
Molle, F., Wester, P. and Hirsch, P. (2007). River basin development and management. In: Molden, D. (ed.) 
Water for food- Water for life. Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture. 
London: EarthScan. Pp. 585-624. 
O'Mara, G.T. (1990). Making Bank irrigation investments more sustainable (it is time to rationalize policy 
guidelines on Bank irrigation projects). Agriculture and Rural Development Department. Working 
Paper. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
Postel S. (1999). Pillars of sand: Can the irrigation miracle last? New York, USA: Norton. 
Repetto, R. (1986). Skimming the water: Rent seeking and the performance of public irrigation systems. 
Research Report 4. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. 47pp. 
Shore, C. and Wright, S. (1997). Policy: A new field of anthropology. In: Shore, C. and Wright, S. (eds.) 
Anthropology of Policy: Critical Perspectives on Governance and Power. London: Routledge. pp. 3–
34. 
Swyngedouw, E. and Kaïka, M. (2002). Urban water: A political-ecology perspective. Built Environment 28, 
124-137. 
UNDESA (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs) and GWP. (2006). Implementing integrated water 
resource management. Document prepared for the 5th Water Forum, Mexico. 
Warner, J. (2008). The politics of flood insecurity. Ph.D thesis. University of Wageningen. 
WCD (World Commission on Dams). (2000). Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-making. 
London: Earthscan. 
8 
